



The Hamiltonian Statecraft

A PUBLICATION OF THE ALEXANDER
HAMILTON SOCIETY AT THE
UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

FALL 2022, VOLUME 1, NUMBER 1

**The Threat of Russian
Presence in Africa**

Elizabeth Sieger

**The Battle for
Influence & the
Thucydides Trap**

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**American vs.
Chinese Vaccine
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by the

**Alexander Hamilton Society at the
University of Michigan**

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Printed in the United States of America

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Editor's Note

Dear reader,

I'm pleased to present the inaugural issue of *The Hamiltonian Statecraft*, a new journal to highlight the excellent written work that the members of the University of Michigan's Alexander Hamilton Society are producing.

In a time where the world is the closest to war that anyone of our generation has seen, it's more important than ever to have open discussion and debate about the role we should have, as Americans, in engaging with the world around us. The Alexander Hamilton Society provides an outlet for students at college campuses across the country to discuss the Hamiltonian tradition of foreign policy and how it applies to our society today. These debates and activities today will inform tomorrow's foreign policy decisionmakers, and we will be a stronger country for it.

The University of Michigan chapter just completed its first year, and I am proud to have been on the executive board of this new organization as the first Editor-in-Chief of our brand-new journal. Starting a new politically inclined organization in today's climate, especially one related to foreign policy, is no small feat, and it's a huge

accomplishment for the founders of our chapter, and I am grateful that they chose me to join them.

The authors of the articles in this journal are some of the most intelligent and insightful undergraduates with whom I have had the pleasure to work. They worked hard, through multiple revisions, to get their pieces into publication. I hope they are truly proud of this final product.

It was a privilege to work on this journal, and I hope you enjoy reading it as much as I have.

With gratitude,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Hayden Jackson', with a stylized, cursive script.

Hayden Jackson, M.A.

Editor-in-Chief

The Threat of Russian Presence in Africa

Elizabeth Sieger*

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Africa provides an ideal theater for Russia to advance geopolitical interests with few political or economic consequences. Expanded influence in Africa gives Moscow more leverage over the West due to the continent's extensive natural resources, legacy of imperialism, easy access to Europe, and fifty-four UN General Assembly votes. This memo outlines why it is imperative that the United States, in conjunction with its allies (Bergmann, Lamond, and Cicarelli 2021), responds emphatically to Russia's geostrategic positioning in African nations, and suggests options to consider to that end. For the time being, the United States and its allies should begin to rebuild a cohesive front against Russian geopolitical expansion, which has already been weakened significantly considering the recent Russian invasion of Ukraine. The transatlantic

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alliance must be bolstered to deter an increasingly aggressive Russia, which has benefited from tension in the US-Europe relationship for far too long.

BACKGROUND

In recent years, Russia has deliberately strengthened its geopolitical influence in many African countries, such as Libya, Mali, Sudan, the Central African Republic, and Mozambique, among others. The Wagner Group, a Russian mercenary outfit, helps embattled leaders stay in power, cementing their ties to Moscow. The Russian-African Summit of 2019 paved the way for booming trade ties between the continent and Moscow (there had previously been little Russian investment into African economic stability or infrastructure, with the nation currently providing less than 1% of Africa's foreign direct investment). Russia is, however, the leading exporter of arms to Africa, controlling 49% of the arms market on the continent.

Africa's generally underfunded governments and underdeveloped institutions are extremely vulnerable to destabilization by Russian engagement on the continent. Russia has the ability to foment humanitarian and political

crises for Europe in its bid for greater global influence (Siegle 2021). As Russia exploits Africa's diplomatic standing for its own national gain and attempts to secure further air and naval base access, the United States must take swift action.

IMPLICATIONS

The post-Cold War order hangs in the balance as the clash between an autocratic, belligerent Russia and the West continues. Allowing an unfettered Russia to continue to gain geopolitical control in Africa gives Putin the potential to fulfill his dream of creating a post-liberal international order. While China attempts to frame a new concept of democracy as an alternative to the Western order, Russia's strategy is simply to delegitimize the perception of democracy as an equitable and profitable system of governance. The effects of expanding Russian influence in Africa are destabilizing and damaging to the already fragile African continent. As Russia props up unpopular leaders with ties to Moscow, Africans calling for reform and change are effectively silenced. What's more, the Russian strategy in Africa is a direct counterweight to American efforts to expand democracy and contain autocracy worldwide. Freedom of the press, the rule of law, and the recognition of

basic human rights constitute the foundational principles of American democracy — Russia’s role in Africa aims to reverse the integration of these principles into the global order.

OPTIONS

As the stakes rise, the United States must collaborate with its NATO allies to hinder rising Russian geopolitical influence in Africa. Below are several options that would help achieve this objective.

Articulate shared interests that the United States holds with Africa. Highlighting that US policy in Africa consists of more than simply countering Russian (or Chinese) influence is imperative. Investment in Africa’s infrastructure and security can counterbalance Putin’s claims that the West is attempting to impose “pressure, intimidation, and blackmail of sovereign African governments” (Balmforth and Osborn 2019). Particularly, investment in global and African health reflects a primary concern of both African governments and the United States (Stith 2021). Africa’s free-market democracies can also provide a lucrative space for the US to invest in, while also feeding the growth of African economies. Aiding in stabilizing the weaker areas of the continent provides the opportunity to impede the growth of

foreign terrorism, which has obvious benefits for both the US and Africa. Africa needs to see the United States as an ally to avoid the continent losing faith in the West and turning to Russia.

Unify NATO allies in response to Russia's geostrategic positioning in Libya. If Russia successfully establishes itself as a key power on the African continent, especially in Libya, with uninhibited air and naval base access in the eastern Mediterranean, it is in a stronger position to threaten Europe's southern borders. Sirte is located only 700 miles from Rome. Fissures in European cohesion, especially during the crisis in Ukraine, have created a vacuum for Russia to expand its influence with little consequence. Europe's military dependence on the United States often results in the US dictating decisions regarding European defense, which has created tension with what could be some of the United States' strongest allies. Russia's positioning in Libya necessitates collaborative discussion with European allies regarding a defense strategy to protect the continent against Russian incursion. Despite Europe's military dependence on the US, leaders of European, US-allied countries have a crucial role in inventing and maintaining defensive procedures in the case of Russian aggression. The US must use its military advantages to band NATO allies together in opposition to an increasingly belligerent Russia. Russia serves as a common enemy, with its unrestrained

growth creating crises for both the US and the European continent.

Work with African and international partners to address legitimate security concerns in countries such as the CAR, Mali, Mozambique, and Sudan. Violent extremism, the COVID-19 pandemic, the global economic crash, and other humanitarian crises represent legitimate, severe threats to both African and American security (Brown, Blyden, and Adkins 2021). The United States would do well not to directly involve itself in civil conflicts, but to work towards combatting Russian attempts at destabilization in specific countries, such as the Central African Republic and Mali. For example, helping Africa fight Russian-sponsored disinformation campaigns would be an appropriate first step.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The first step in containing Russian expansion into Africa must be increasing cooperation between the US and its European allies. A united front is necessary for there to be any hope of change on the continent. Putin has taken advantage of divisions in the West to expand his post-liberal international order in the past and will continue to do so if

there is not a swift and decisive response from not just the United States, but also its European allies. Such increased cooperation is also fundamental to fulfilling the other recommendations outlined in this memo. Working alongside African countries is an equally important goal, but one that similarly does not have to be undertaken by the United States alone.

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The Battle for Influence & the Thucydides Trap

Connor Shepp[†]

INTRODUCTION

In the late 5th century BCE, one of the first historians, Thucydides, wrote a detailed account of the Peloponnesian Wars. His writings outlined the reasons for the war. Athens was an emerging power that threatened the hegemony of Sparta. Thucydides believed that because of this changing power dynamic, the two city-states were destined to go to war. There are numerous examples in history of war between emerging powers and past hegemons. They are so frequent that it seems that these countries, kingdoms, and empires were destined to clash. Since Thucydides was the first person to identify this destiny-like recurrence, the problem was coined the Thucydides Trap. You do not need to go far into the past to find examples of the Thucydides Trap. For example, during the late 19th and early 20th

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centuries, Japan was emerging as an economic and military power in the Far East, which had been under the dome of Chinese influence for thousands of years. China and Japan went to war not only once, but twice. Soon after, the other hegemon in the Far East, Russia would be attacked by the ever-growing Japanese Empire. In this example and many others, the emerging power has nearly always taken control over buffer states, or in some way or another, the emerging power's territory and influence would creep closer to the ruling power's territory or its sphere of influence. Today, there is a clear example of a ruling power and an emerging power. The ruling power is the United States of America, and the emerging power is the People's Republic of China. China is taking the same steps that past emerging powers have taken and is continually looking for ways to stretch its sphere of influence. The United States and its allies must increase its influence and command in these regions being absorbed into the sphere and control of the Chinese Communist Party. If the U.S. fails to do so, the two nations may fall into the Thucydides Trap like many before them.

HISTORICAL EVIDENCE

As stated previously, the emerging power, Japan, captured Korea and Taiwan from China after the First Sino-Japanese

War. They also attempted to impose the Twenty-One Demands on China after the First World War. First, the Japanese took over China's sphere of influence and imposed their own rules on the Chinese state. Then, they invaded China.

Even in antiquity, the examples of the Thucydides Trap include encroachment by the emerging power into the ruling power's sphere of influence and territory. In the 3rd century BCE, the Romans were an emerging power in the Mediterranean, and Carthage, an economic superpower in the region, was the ruling power. By this time the Roman legions had conquered most of modern Italy, except Sardinia and Sicily. These islands were under the partial control and influence of Carthage. The Romans knew that the island being so close to the Italian Peninsula would be a great staging ground for an invasion of the Italian peninsula. The Romans almost immediately attempted to convince city-states under Carthage's influence to join them, and then launched an invasion into Sicily, beginning the First Punic War. The First Punic War was a war fought over a sphere of influence, but the Second Punic War was a war fought to crush the opposing side. At the end of the Second Punic War, it was made clear who the hegemonic power in the Mediterranean was, Rome. This was only possible because Carthage allowed Rome to grow to a size where it could

challenge them and failed to defend their sphere of influence in the First Punic War.

Throughout history, the many examples of the Thucydides Trap all have this first battle for influence, though it may not include direct conflict between the emerging and ruling powers. It may instead be a proxy war, or a battle for who can put a king on the buffer state's throne, or even a battle for economic domination in the region. It is a common occurrence with the changing of hegemons, and there are hundreds of examples scattered throughout history.

MODERN EXAMPLE

Today, China is expanding its influence throughout the world and attempting to bring United States allies and other nations in the region into its fold. This attempt is perhaps the most obvious in the South China Sea, which is one of the most important trade routes in the world. China claims the majority of the islands located in the sea and has been accused of building small military bases in the sea. These claims and military installations bring an ever-growing military presence to the region. Because China claims the majority of islands within the South China Sea, they do not feel the need to recognize other countries' waters. For

example, one U.S. ally in the region, the Philippines, brought a case against the People's Republic of China in the Permanent Court of Arbitration due to what the Philippines viewed as a violation of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (Blinken 2022). China was attempting to claim the two hundred nautical miles of economic exclusive zone for various unpopulated islands in the South China Sea. They are hoping to take control of a sea with one of the richest fishing grounds, busiest shipping lanes, and untapped oil fields with no regard for the surrounding countries. The Philippines won the case in the international court, and the People's Republic of China decided that they were not going to recognize the ruling. China views this region as part of its sphere of influence, though many of the nations in the region do not have friendly relations with China. The People's Liberation Army has been operating patrols and conducting various naval exercises in the South China Sea. To counter these claims and the aggressive military moves, the United States and its allies have been conducting "freedom of navigation" operations in the sea (Freund 2017).

China will continue to attempt to gather more territory and exert its influence in the Indo-Pacific and around the world, just as past examples of the Thucydides Trap have shown. The United States and its allies must put a stop to this before it is too late. Stopping China's aggression in the

South China Sea will create stronger bonds with the nations in and surrounding the sea, as well as around the world. To avoid falling into the Thucydides Trap, the United States must push back against China before they gain more influence and power. In the past, many of those who waited until the emerging power's military, economy, or influence was greater than theirs simply fell and were at the mercy of the new hegemonic power. The U.S. must prove that it will stand up to those who break international law and aid nations being bullied by such countries to avoid the mistakes made by past ruling powers. It can do this by relying more on countries such as India for manufactured goods, aiding all countries around the Indo-Pacific, so that they can become less dependent on Chinese goods, and making sure no country falls into the authoritarian model that China would prefer.

CONCLUSION

Nearly every time a hegemon of a region changed, it began with the emerging power expanding its influence and territory. This has been true since the time of the Romans when they first conquered new territories under the sphere influence of Carthage. The Chinese are attempting to control one of the most important seas in the land by illegal

means. They are actively trying to strike fear into and coerce the surrounding nations into following their rules. The emerging nation is once again collecting new territories and projecting its influence this time on the shores of the U.S.'s Indo-Pacific allies. The United States must stop the overreach of the CCP before it is forced to stop them at our own or an ally's front door. The United States and the rest of the world need to show that it is necessary to abide by international law and the rulings of the international courts. If China continues this path with nothing standing in its way, then the ideas that the current international order was built on will crumble and be replaced by the will of the Chinese Communist Party.

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American vs. Chinese Vaccine Diplomacy in Latin America

Sebastian Llanes[‡]

The United States has imposed its influence on the Latin American region for centuries. This is highlighted by their numerous attempts to overthrow democratically-elected leaders – most of whom do not share their political and economic ideals – to their overdependence on Latin-American resources leading to lopsided trade agreements. For years they have held a monopoly on influence over the Latin American market and its politics. However, due to rapid globalization, the United States simply does not have the same stronghold it once had on the region; instead of most Latin American exports going to the United States and its proxies like they did in the past, these countries now have more fluid trade options in China, India, and the Western world.

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This bodes poorly for American dominance in the region as Latin American countries don't rely on American business as much. This trend is not only visible in trade. A shift in the political and economic theory used in federal policy across Latin American countries has further shown the weakening of American dominance in the region. Increasingly, Latin American electorates are starting to drift away from conservative, ultra-capitalist candidates and electing more leftwing candidates, as we have seen in Chile, Mexico, Peru, and Colombia (Woodford, Vargas, and Araujo 2022). As the overlap between American and Latin American ideologies fades, the United States is more at risk of having hostile neighbors if China weaponizes its economic power over the region in the face of global inflation. As the trend continues to accelerate, the United States should work with Latin American countries on an even playing field instead of trying to assert its rule on the region.

One key area where the United States should show this approach is in its vaccine diplomacy. While it is true that Latin American countries have reached the point where they don't necessarily need to rely on American aid, the United States should still demonstrate that it is their key ally in times of need. This is especially true since most Latin American countries do not have the funding to develop vaccines or technology to help fight the spread and severity of the deadly virus. Currently, the United States isn't

portraying its allyship to its Latin American neighbors, leaving a power vacuum open for a competitor to provide needed support. That competitor has proved to be China, arguably the United States' most formidable rival in geopolitics.

China has dominated the vaccination effort in Latin America by distributing 250 million doses of its vaccine (Sinopharm, Sinovac-CoronaVac, and CanSino) while the United States has distributed a meager three million doses of Western-developed vaccines (Pfizer, Moderna, and Johnson & Johnson). With American vaccines proving to be more effective than Chinese-produced vaccines, the United States should be at the forefront of vaccine distribution to the region (McGregor 2021). Instead, the United States is focusing its efforts on India and other Asian countries, despite not being historical allies with them nor them historically sharing the same values Americans hold dear. As a result, U.S.-Latin American relations are rapidly deteriorating while Chinese-Latin American relations are strengthening (Steunkel 2021). While the United States should not try to assert its dominance on these Latin American countries, it should strongly encourage them to side with it over its enemy; an alliance with the United States automatically negates the possibility of also being true allies with a rival like China as their foreign policy goals are antithetical to one another. The way to do this is also the

moral choice: provide aid to Latin American countries who desperately need protection against a virus that has decimated their populations.

As the dynamic of these alliances shift, the effects on both politics and economics have changed, and its effects could potentially be catastrophic for the United States. As we see with vaccine diplomacy, the economic impact these alliances have had has been noticeable – and the United States should be worried. According to the Inter-American Development Bank, Latin American exports to China increased by 34.7% year-on-year basis, while Latin American exports to the United States increased by a meager 3.9% year-on-year basis. By 2035, the World Economic Forum (WEF) projects China will rapidly close the gap between itself and the United States as Latin America's main trade partner. WEF projects that there will be less than a 5% gap, when just twenty years ago, the gap was more than 50% (Roy 2022). Latin America is starting to rely more and more on Chinese imports than American imports each day; even for countries like Argentina, Bolivia, Peru, and Brazil, China has surpassed the United States as their main importers.

The United States' long reign over Latin American politics and economics is over, but that does not mean it should let its biggest competitor fill in the vacuum it left. The United States urgently needs to prioritize its relations with Latin America. While it shouldn't try to assert their influence like

it vigorously did for centuries, it should still take on the role China is trying to fill – their strongest and most dependable ally. Providing aid that would save hundreds of thousands of people from a deadly virus would be a good start.

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Ireland and the UK After Brexit

Lucas Alonso[§]

The history of the relationship between Ireland and the United Kingdom is long, ancient, and above all, tumultuous. A major fracture in this relationship began in the 16th century with King Henry VIII and his desire to have his first marriage annulled. Until that time, the state religion, and predominant religion among the Irish and English peoples, was Roman Catholicism. However, after the Pope declined his request to have his marriage officially annulled, Henry was enraged and created the Church of England as a new branch of the Protestant faith. Although this move was purely political, it gained a following that would set the stage for alienation and sectarianism in parts of the nation that were largely Catholic—especially Ireland (Roos 2021).

The divide between Ireland and the United Kingdom continued to brew for centuries but came to a boiling point in 1922. Following the bitter struggle during the Irish War of Independence which began in 1919 and ended in 1921, The IRA (Irish Republican Army) beat back the British army and

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officially gained their independence (Roos 2021). However, Northern Ireland, a part of the island which contained a larger number of Unionists, remained in the UK. Thus, the island was divided into Northern Ireland and Ireland. The division of Ireland into two partitions subsequently caused major violence and terrorism to ensue throughout the mid to late 20th century. Much of the violence was derived from sectarianism which saw Unionists and Separatists, two clashing ideals on the same island, separated only by a loose border line. As the century progressed, Northern Irish rebels sought to end British rule over them due to discrimination against the Catholic minorities in major cities such as Belfast and Londonderry. This sparked decades of uprisings, protests, and violence known as “The Troubles,” in which Irish Separatists and the Irish Republican Army fought against Unionists and the British government in an attempt to gain independence and freedom for all of Ireland from British rule (Roos 2021). Although both sides perpetrated enormous amounts of violence, the conflict remained a stalemate for about 30 years.

The violence was finally quelled in 1998 with the signing of the Good Friday Agreement, which sustained peace in the region between those who wanted to remain part of the United Kingdom, and those who wanted a united Irish Republic. It left the state of Northern Ireland’s sovereignty up to decision through a possible referendum in the future but stipulated that the power in the region must be shared

equally between Unionists and Nationalists (Northern Ireland Assembly Education Service 2021).

This agreement was largely able to be made because both the United Kingdom and Ireland were members of the European Union, which would prove extremely relevant to the current situation. These century-long disagreements, divides, and tensions between the two bordering nations of Ireland and the UK, paint the picture of a relationship that has been, and remains, constantly fluctuating. Thus, when the people of the United Kingdom voted to leave the European Union in 2016 by a slight majority, there was much uncertainty and concern as to the state of the Good Friday Agreement, the state of trade between Ireland and the UK, and the reaction by the people of both nations to this departure which sent shockwaves around the world.

“Brexit,” which was voted on in 2016, and implemented on January 31, 2020, was anything but a unanimous decision. The total voting percentage came out to be 52% to 48% altogether (nidirect n.d.). However, upon further analysis of the voting tally, one will find that the vote looks quite different when it is divided by partitions in the UK. For example, Northern Ireland voted more convincingly to remain in the EU, with a percentage of 56% to 44%. Scotland voted even more strongly to remain with a percentage of 62% to 38% (nidirect n.d.). These statistics illustrate the difficulty of the situation—specifically, the disparity

between Northern Ireland's overwhelming decision to remain, versus the overall result of the referendum. Given the history between Northern Ireland, Ireland, and the United Kingdom, the decision to go through with Brexit put the massive strides for peace made in the Good Friday Agreement in serious jeopardy.

The Good Friday Agreement was made based on the assumption that the British and Northern Irish would be EU members and enjoy the economic and security benefits that come along with this membership. However, after their departure and relinquishing of membership in the European Union, the status of Northern Irish citizens was called into question. Specifically, the potential for renewed conflict was heightened because the Northern Irish had their vote overruled by the more populated mainland. The fact that they were compelled to leave the European Union against the consent of their majority highlights the reason that such sectarianism had arisen in the region in the first place. A "hard Brexit" means that the only land border between the UK and the EU is the border between Ireland and Northern Ireland. In any normal scenario, this would mean increasing customs checks, trade barriers, and overall difficulty for people and things flowing between the two nations (Helm et al. 2022).

Considering the fragile nature of the situation in Northern Ireland, certain protocols had to be implemented for peace

to be maintained in the region. To ensure the keeping of peace created by the Good Friday Agreement, the Brexit protocols on the island resembled more of an exception to the rule than anything else. As part of the hard Brexit, Northern Ireland was formally withdrawn from the EU but was allowed to maintain the EU customs protocols and EU movement of goods protocols, meaning that there would essentially be no hard border between Ireland and Northern Ireland. This also stipulated that Northern Ireland could move goods and citizens to Great Britain freely; however, the British could not move goods and people freely to Northern Ireland. This came with much dismay to the Unionists.

Another major fluctuating aspect of the hard Brexit is the state of trade and the economic situation between Ireland and the United Kingdom. For context, the ultimate decision of the UK to enter a hard Brexit meant that the UK was separated from all previous benefits of being an EU member nation. For instance, Ireland would use the Euro as currency and have all the freedoms that come along with being an EU member state, like the free flow of goods and services between other EU member states. By contrast, Northern Ireland would be on the pound system along with the United Kingdom. This would also mean that it would be more difficult for people and goods to move between the United Kingdom and other nations, as there would be increased border checks and security.

At first, Ireland suffered greatly from Brexit as many of their products and people were unable to come and go from the UK as easily as they previously would. Because Brexit allows the UK to assess its own tariffs, Irish exports were subjected to increased trade costs, while imports were more expensive, lowering overall GDP (Copenhagen Economics 2018). However, in the past year, Ireland has adapted to Brexit to their advantage and a great British disadvantage. Irish and Northern Irish manufacturers and shippers have decided that rather than transporting their goods through the UK and then onto the rest of Europe (as they used to do before Brexit made it too expensive), they are bypassing the British, and making cheaper deals with their EU partners in Northern France (Keane 2016). The Northern Ireland Protocol has allowed Irish buyers to increasingly purchase goods from Northern Ireland, and for Northern Ireland to ship their goods over the soft border to Ireland. From there the Irish ship the goods out of Dublin and on to their EU partners in France and Spain, bypassing the stringent UK security checks. This recent development has seemingly transformed the Irish and Northern Irish economies so much that their imports and exports have risen over 30% in the first quarter of 2022 (Keane 2016). Although the effect of the COVID-19 pandemic has skewed data from previous years, the numbers from the first two quarters of this year prove that the island is learning how to adapt to Brexit, and

the British are going to be increasingly struggling to keep up.

With all the factors of Brexit considered, some may wonder why, although narrowly, did the citizens of the UK vote for Brexit? The answer is a complicated one, which involves many distinct aspects that came to fruition at one time. However, one major development that led to Brexit is the rise of nationalism worldwide, especially in 2016, when the referendum was held. Around the world, nationalism was on the rise, a result of the influx of immigrants from war-torn nations, terrorism, and spikes in tariffs and prices that politicians scapegoated as the result of poor international agreements. Multiple polls and reports cite the reasons for the Brexit vote as culminations of these world developments. The majority of Brexit voters cited immigration policy and sovereignty as the two main reasons behind their vote (McMahon n.d.). Boiled down, citizens of the United Kingdom saw their nation and other EU neighbors, being increasingly targeted by terrorism because of “loose” immigration policies between EU countries. They saw their communities becoming increasingly diversified. They saw prices and unemployment rising in the nation, while the EU still demanded that they fill a significant role in helping other nations. These factors sparked nationalist fervor, as British citizens thought they were losing their national identity and getting taken advantage of due to their role in the European Union. This fervor, coupled with the

popularity and election of Donald Trump in the US, who preyed upon the same sentiments, made many Britons empowered to isolate. They felt that they needed to ensure the safety and prosperity of their own nation before any others, and they felt this was best achieved by leaving the EU. Thus, former Prime Minister David Cameron allowed for a referendum to leave the EU, expecting to gain overwhelming votes to stay in the EU, silencing the issue. When the vote came in that the people had decided to leave, Cameron resigned, and Theresa May spearheaded the official Brexit negotiations. What many UK citizens failed to realize was that membership in the European Union meant more than just immigration and trade; it meant leaving an entire web of relationships. Unfortunately, it became clear that Brexit would not be achieved by the snap of a finger, and the implications of Brexit, especially on neighboring nations like Ireland, were clearly significant.

Overall, although the fact that Brexit was voted for by a majority of UK citizens, the move has undoubtedly been a negative decision for Britain as they have suffered economic downturn with lower GDP growth than the EU (Copenhagen Economics 2018), political instability with the resignation of three prime ministers in six years since the Brexit vote (Editors of Encyclopedia Britannica 2019), and more difficult trade with world powers. However, due to the Northern Ireland Protocol, the Irish island has been able to adapt to the economic barriers that it faced at the onset of Brexit,

while also maintaining the peace created by the Good Friday Agreement. Overall, Brexit has continued to hamper Britain, but innovation and diversification of trade routes have allowed Ireland and Northern Ireland to enter a period of recovery and success by trading within the island and with other EU nations. One can conclude that the movement to exit the EU in the hopes of better trade deals and more security has occurred on occasion, but the cost to Britain has been far greater as their relationship with Ireland, one of their biggest trade partners, has been diminished significantly. Beyond just the length in which it took to get a deal on Brexit, the uncertainty and administrative failures that Brexit brings on to this day illustrates the lack of consideration that the voters placed on the implications of such a move.

Luckily, the Northern Ireland Protocol has maintained peace and has caused a trend towards prosperity in the economic situation on the island of Ireland; however, Great Britain is increasingly left out of the equation. This is proof that leaving an international partnership can be much more complex than first thought, and major partners may turn away from dealings rather than paying higher prices and crossing red tape to continue those dealings. It illustrates the fact that the British people should have further considered the consequences of leaving, and not presumed that Ireland and Northern Ireland were dependent upon them. Thus, as the Irish island continues to adapt and

evolve away from British dealings, it is now the British turn to adapt, as they are currently being outmaneuvered by the Irish island in the system from which they sought to benefit.

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International Cooperation and the Philippines: A Human Rights Issue

Diana Dolezalova^{}**

Since his inauguration in 2016, Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte's administration has almost entirely focused on waging a war on drugs, an effort that is estimated to have killed thousands of people in the Philippines due to abuse of power by law enforcement. Suspected drug dealers are being severely punished through physical and mental abuse by police across the country, with urban poor populations being the most targeted. However, reports of these killings are being suppressed due to media censorship--since President Duterte came to power, journalists, activists, and political opposition have been met with police intimidation and jail time. International pressure on the Philippines to suspend human rights abuses has been minimal, despite drastic spikes in police killings. The likelihood of the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) encouraging the

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Philippines to respect the human rights of its citizens, particularly activists, remains unclear due to distribution problems within the UN member states as well as information problems from the Philippine government.

The reality of the situation in the Philippines is grim. From Duterte's infamous election speech where he says, "If I make it to the presidential palace, I will do just what I did as mayor. You drug pushers, holdup men, and do-nothings, you better get out because I'll kill you" (Kine 2016) to the long-lasting effects on victim's families, Duterte's brutal rule has allowed the police to kill en masse. The target is mostly the urban poor, who live in slums along the periphery of Philippine cities. They receive little to no aid from the government, and in Duterte's view, pollute the nature of the Philippines (Kine 2016). His cruel extermination of these people is thinly disguised as cracking down on crime when the only crime these citizens have committed is being impoverished. However, the little attention that this tyranny has gained has failed to deliver an actual stop to the abuse.

The UNHRC has failed to create a comprehensive investigation into the blatant disregard for human rights in the Philippines due to a distribution problem within the member states. In October of 2020, the Philippines, in conjunction with Iceland, presented a resolution to the UN urging them to provide "technical assistance... focused on

areas including accountability; data gathering of violations by the police; civic space; counter-terrorism legislation, and a rights-based approach to drug control” (Amnesty International 2020). While the resolution passed, experts concluded that the decision was a missed opportunity to alleviate the Philippine people of human rights abuses. Rachel Choa-Howard, Philippines Researcher at Amnesty International, said that the legislation did not address the “pervasive impunity in the country” (Amnesty International 2020). The lack of justice for the victims of Duterte’s administration has called into question the interests of the actors within the UNHRC. The council members are determined by the direct and secret votes of the General Assembly, regardless of their previous human rights records (UN Human Rights Council n.d.). In 2020, the member states with questionable human rights records included China, Eritrea, Saudi Arabia, and the Philippines. With such an audience, it is reasonable to infer that the regard for human rights within the discussion may not have been to standard. While some countries may have interests in protecting human rights, such as the United Kingdom or Australia, other member states may not have the same commitment due to their centralized and authoritarian governments. The people of these countries are subject to merciless regimes where they have no freedom of speech or protest, and as a result, the government has been known to suppress the media and dissenters.

Furthermore, the timing of the resolution to investigate human rights concerns coincided with a new review of extra-judicial killings, deepening the need for a full examination of Duterte's abuses. As a result, critics speculate the resolution is a move to appease international pressure and take away attention from the situation. In a press release, Amnesty International cited its concern with the situation, stating that "[t]he timing and circumstances of the inter-agency panel has been clearly designed to shield the government from scrutiny and includes the very agencies involved in the killings and other violations" (Amnesty International 2020). By having Duterte's abettors represent the Philippines in the UNHRC, the abuses of his administration are hidden from the eyes of the international world. The desire for a complete investigation into the human rights abuses in the Philippines is clear, and minor pacifications of the impunity problem neglect the victims of Duterte's regime.

In addition, conflicting information about the human rights abuse data provided by the Philippine government, despite investigations, creates information problems harmful to international cooperation. In June of 2020, the UN Office of the High Commissioner investigated the human rights situation in the Philippines, which concluded that "Since the Government launched its campaign against illegal drugs in 2016, official figures indicate that at least 8,663 people have been killed" (UN Human Rights Office 2020) while

human rights groups like the Human Rights Watch “believe the actual number could be three times as high” (Human Rights Watch 2020). Such a disparity within the data creates uncertainty in the gravity of the issue, thus causing concern for international cooperation. Within environments where the integrity of human rights may be compromised, data like this is essential for transparency. Such air of inconsistency creates a prime breeding ground for human rights abusers to create misleading campaigns diminishing their misconduct. In fact, Menardo Guevarra, the Philippines Secretary of Justice, stated the government had created a panel that he claimed would review nearly 6,000 killings by police officers (Human Rights Watch 2020). Laila Matar, deputy Geneva director at Human Rights Watch, refers to the secretary’s ruse, saying “The Duterte administration is once again pulling out all the stops to get the Philippines out of the spotlight and off the agenda of the Human Rights Council” (Human Rights Watch 2020). Acts such as these portray how crucial it is for Duterte to maintain his perception of innocence; as the officials of the Philippine government would have it, the perception of the Philippine government needs to be one of clarity and accommodation. By maintaining such a perception, the government can avert international pressure and continue its regime. Such actions illustrate just how perceptions serve the purpose of furthering an agenda, thus creating an essential motive for Duterte to maintain positive perceptions.

Others may argue that no international resolution will be reached due to domestic personal gain of government officials on Duterte's side, which is valid. Arguably, with little international pressure, the Duterte regime is unlikely to care enough to stop its human rights abuses within its own borders. Many countries may put human rights at the forefront of their constitutions; however, leaders often choose domestic political gain over international human rights issues. However, in the grand scope of things, institutions such as the UN are designed to serve purposes such as these and the unlikelihood of a resolution happening is a result of the nature of the issue at hand, which is a combination of distribution and information problems. While problematic, both these issues can be resolved with a commitment to truth and clarity. As Philippines UN Ambassador Evan Garcia states, the Philippines needs "investigative and accountability mechanisms ... [and] the establishment of compliance monitoring systems for the national police and engagement with civil society" (Nebahey 2020). With a greater engagement from the international community for these systems to keep the integrity of human rights strong, international cooperation can be reached.

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Philosophy & Warfare: A Case Against a Chinese D-Day

Raphael Rahman^{††}

“To win one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the acme of skill. To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill”
– Sun Tzu, *Art of War*

Post-war American warfighting has seen an interesting dichotomy wherein the United States Armed Forces are able to subdue their adversaries on the tactical level but fail spectacularly to fully realize their strategic and political aims against a determined opponent. The American experience in Iraq from 2003 to 2011 suggests that American forces perform spectacularly when fighting under optimal conditions—conventional mechanized warfare against uniformed opponents—but are not as successful in asymmetric warfare wherein the Armed Forces are forced to fight on the terms and conditions of their adversaries. In

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both Vietnam and Afghanistan, the United States government continuously failed to establish the preconditions for victory or to accurately determine the warfighting capabilities of their adversaries despite clear tactical superiority. What this alludes to is a cultural psychosis wherein a lack of imagination by America's high-level policymakers and military strategists hampers the ability of America's Armed Forces to fulfill the nation's wartime political goals.

Chinese military actions against Taiwan cannot be construed through a Clausewitzian lens and that the Allied amphibious invasion of Normandy in 1944 cannot accurately be used as a template for a Taiwan amphibious invasion. Instead, the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLA Navy) will employ subversion and *informationized warfare* (信息化) tactics in line with the military philosophy laid out in Sun Tzu's *Art of War* as the basis of their strategic thinking towards Taiwan and that lessons learned from the 2003 Invasion of Iraq have a deep impact on how the PLA views future wars against the United States & her allies. In doing so, American policy makers can gain a clear understanding of how divergent philosophical paradigms can shape the decision-making of their opponents in ways the United States Armed Forces and government would not traditionally expect.

PART 1: WHAT IS INFORMATIONIZED WARFARE?

To understand informationized warfare, it is first important to note that the PLA is a distinctly Eastern military and that its military tradition is firmly grounded in its Dynastic tradition. Whereas the United States Armed Forces are a characteristically Western military and that its tradition can be traced back to the emergence of professional European armies in the 18th Century, dubbed the Military Revolution. These differences on the most basic level can be distilled down to two competing methods of war: Clausewitzian Warfare and Tzuian Warfare. Tzuian Warfare developed from the 2500-year-old text, *Art of War* (孙子兵法) by Sun Tzu. Clausewitzian Warfare hails from the post-Napoleonic treatise, *On War* (Vom Kriege) by Prussian General Karl Von Clausewitz.

The term informationized warfare forms a part of China's broader strategy of *limited warfare under high tech conditions* (高科技条件下的局部战). It is a theory used to understand how asymmetric and grey-zone tactics can be used to exhaust and weaken an opponent, allowing for their rapid collapse upon a decisive action (Jacobs and Carley 2022). From the Chinese perspective, the 2003 invasion of Iraq began in 1991 with the end of the Gulf War. In the lead up to the invasion, the United States government undertook an

extensive public relations campaign to manufacture consent for a military offensive into Iraq. American sanctions aimed at eliminating Saddam's WMD program served as "a form of financial non-military warfare" that degraded Iraq's warfighting capacity before the Invasion had even begun (Jacobs and Carley 2022). The United States government used its global influence to "garner international consensus" for regime-change, strengthening its coalition whilst neutralizing Iraq's potential ally, Russia/USSR (Jacobs and Carley 2022). During the Invasion, the Chinese noted the efficacy of US PSYOP/MISO in dissuading enemy resistance and boosting domestic support— "effective news coverage of precision-guided missiles hitting targets... [propped] up US public opinion... [demoralized] Iraqi military" (Jacobs and Carley 2022). From the Chinese perspective, the 2003 invasion of Iraq was a clear example of how non-military actions waged before the formal start of hostilities could lead to decisive military outcomes in kinetic conditions. The theory of informationized warfare developed out of the belief that military action should serve as a swift *coup de grâce* in a protracted struggle whose outcome is first decided by the winning of "soft battles" (non-kinetic operations) aimed at degrading an opponent through a whole-of-society approach to warfare (Jacobs and Carley 2022).

The Chinese theory of informationized warfare aligns with a key principle of Tzuian warfare, that the best approach to win wars is to fight without fighting or *attacking by stratagem* — “the skillful leaders subdue the enemy’s troops without any fighting” (Tzu 2000). Whereas Clausewitz favored decisive engagements to destroy the warfighting capacity of a hostile state in its entirety—“*military power* must be destroyed, that is, reduced to such as state as to not be able to prosecute the war”—Tzu believed that it was best to capture a hostile force intact so that it could be co-opted to serve the purposes of the state— “it is better to recapture an army than to destroy it” (Von Clausewitz 1873; Tzu 2000). Clausewitzian tradition believes in *battles of annihilation* wherein the Armed Forces draw out and destroy the enemy forces in a killing blow. In contrast to *attacking by stratagem*, Clausewitzian tradition conceptualizes warfare as “nothing but a duel on an extensive scale” (Von Clausewitz 1873). From the Clausewitzian tradition, the object of war is to fight blow by blow until the opening arises for a final killing blow against the opponent’s center of gravity — “always situated where the greatest mass of matter is collected... a shock against the center of gravity of a body always produces the greatest effect” (Von Clausewitz 1873).

This difference between Tzuian warfare as attacking by stratagem and Clausewitzian warfare forms the foundation upon which the PLA can be thought of as an Eastern military

and the United States Armed Forces can be thought of as a Western military. It is important to consider Clausewitzian doctrine dissects warfare into individual components or a series of blows and (in terms of pathology) emphasizes individual proficiency in each individual component. Tzuian doctrine values interconnectedness (attacking by stratagem) wherein multiple parts converge at a pre-determined outcome—the enemy is defeated before entering the ring. In Clausewitzian doctrine, good tactics is strategy. In Tzuian doctrine, strategy yields tactics. Hence NATO forces focus on maintaining superb tactical proficiency and the PLA focuses on facilitating the individual placement of forces in a wider context, like pawns hounding a King towards checkmate (Jacobs and Carley 2022). NATO combined arms differs from PLA combined arms wherein NATO seeks to network different platforms for maximal applied lethality and PLA combined arms seeks to properly position and coordinate assets to allow for “a unity of effort” (Jacobs and Carley 2022).

PART 2: TAIWAN NOT D-DAY

Operation Overlord (aka D-Day) can be seen as the manifestation of Western doctrinal thinking in an amphibious context. The operation on the most basic level

can be distilled down to three main components: intelligence gathering and subversion, naval bombardment accompanying aerial infiltration, and the establishing of a beachhead. Months of planning and preparation, engineering solutions—the creation of amphibious tanks, floating harbors and ISR techniques—and the house spent training didn't serve to decide the outcome of the duel but to facilitate a tactical outcome. It was ultimately the paratroopers who secured bridges, Rangers who captured heights, and infantrymen responsible for storming the beaches that each functioned like a Clausewitzian blow. When struck in tandem, each task served the purpose of driving the Wehrmacht from the strategically crucial Normandy beachhead.

The fundamental purpose of the landings was to put ashore sufficient forces to smash the center of gravity of the Wehrmacht forces in Normandy. While subversive actions such as Operation Fortitude—which feigned a landing at Pas de Calais, diverting defenders from Normandy—were crucial to the operation, the purpose of all the “soft battles” preceding the operation were to facilitate a battle of annihilation in favor of the Allies (Ambrose 1981). When planning the operation, Eisenhower's ultimate purpose was clear—faced with the conundrum of only being able to deploy five divisions of 20,000 men each on a narrow-strip of coast and facing fifty-five experienced Wehrmacht

divisions, he had to delay the battle of annihilation until the balance of forces favored the Allies (Ambrose 1981). As opposed to attacking by stratagem, the tactics facilitated the strategy. The “soft battles” were fought so that Allied advantages could be brought together in space and time for the deciding duel. Combined arms between naval, airborne, and armored forces came together so that each individual soldier could have the effect of ten soldiers and so that the lethality of each platform could be fully used. Yet was ultimately this well-supported infantryman placed in time and space through herculean effort that smashed the enemy’s center of gravity, deciding the outcome.

Tzuian theory dictates that the “soft battles” be waged to destroy the opposing force’s capacity to fight before actual kinetic engagement. Unlike at Normandy where “soft battles” served to magnify the punching power of the amphibious landing, the amphibious landing occurs to deliver a final *coup de grâce* to an already defeated defender. In 2003, China unveiled the Three Warfare Doctrine to capitalize upon lessons learned from the Iraq invasion. These “Three Warfares” are “psychological warfare, public opinion warfare and legal warfare” (Jacobs and Carley 2022). Together these tactics serve to isolate and demoralize the Taiwanese government and public much like the United States accomplished against Iraq. Chinese strategy in Taiwan is predicated upon the belief that a successful

concert of decapitation strikes, grey zone tactics, and CDO or “cognitive domain operations” will break the ability of the Taiwanese Armed Forces mount an organized defense (Jacobs and Carley 2022). The war that China seeks in Taiwan should peaceful reunification with the mainland fail differs from Normandy in that the object of war is to apply killing force to an already weakened structure. While kinetic strikes are necessary, for instance, to effectively destroy the Taiwanese Air Force, the PLA Air Force is already acting to degrade Taiwan’s air defenses by continuously flying into its ADIZ and forcing a Taiwanese air response and attriting Taiwanese fighter aviation over months and years (Jacobs and Carley 2022). Chinese infiltration and disinformation within Taiwan’s social media ecosystem serve to fragment society and reduce trust in the government which undermines wartime mobilization. In one case, 10,000+ protesters rallied against a fictitious ban on the traditional practice of burning joss paper (Jacobs and Carley 2022). Unlike at Normandy, Chinese informationized warfare does not serve to multiply tactical forces in a battle of annihilation but break the will of the defending, eliminating the need for such an operation. Attacking by stratagem seeks to gain victory before the start of war. Through this lens, China’s incursions into Taiwan’s ADIZ cannot be seen through the same lens as Operation Fortitude (a feint) or as an equivalent to the airdrops near Normandy which allowed the Allies to secure bridges ahead of advancing troops. It’s

important to understand that Chinese informationized warfare does not seek to enhance future tactical operations but to attain victory before a battle of annihilation can even foment.

CONCLUDING THOUGHTS

Fifty-years-ago Walter Cronkite delivered his famous *Mired in Stalemate* Broadcast. Overnight, American public opinion towards involvement in Vietnam shifted dooming America's war aims in the Second Indochina War. What occurred that night was the result of a long-term, integral disconnect between the actions of policymakers in Washington and troops on the ground that resulted in costly and ineffective military strategies. Forty-five years later, the documentary *This Is What Winning Looks Like* would again expose poor strategic decision-making and corruption in prosecuting another American war. Both are proof that US policymakers do not understand the cultural context in which war is fought and to craft policy accordingly.

Less than one year after America's defeat at the hands of the Taliban, the United States risks a similar outcome if it does not understand the importance of understanding an adversary and of employing those lessons at the strategic

level. Much of warfighting relates to understanding the actions and decision-making process of one's enemy (the very purpose of intelligence), and all cultures have their own philosophical tradition for understanding warfare. Human conflict, after all, is as old as humanity itself and has been practiced by even the most primitive societies in history. It is foolish and naïve for the United States or any government to believe that its adversaries will behave in accordance with Western paradigms.

Understanding Tzuian military tradition within the context of Chinese warfighting and employing those lessons at the highest level of government is crucial if the United States wishes to blunt a potential Chinese invasion of Taiwan. Such an invasion if successful would effectively end American unipolarity. China's ongoing "soft battles" in and around the Taiwanese battlespace should not be analogized with the subversion tactics practiced by the Allies in the lead up to Normandy because the two actions served distinctly different purposes. From the Chinese perspective, the war is currently being decided while the United States sees itself as preparing for the decisive outcome.

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